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ARKANSAS TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE LAW: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
I. INTRODUCTION
A store customer complains about the rude behavior of a salesclerk, and
the store owner fires the clerk. A friend recommends that a manufacturer
buy component parts from a supplier who uses recycled packaging products,
and the manufacturer terminates her requirements contract with her current
supplier. An employee, who is sexually harassed on the job, reports the
harassment to his supervisor who fires the harasser. A salesperson makes
a cold call on a rival's customer, offering a similar product for a much
lower price, and the customer decides to breach his contract with the rival,
pay damages, and buy from the new company. The store customer, friend,
employee, and salesperson in the above scenarios are prima facie liable for
tortious interference with a contract or business expectancy under Arkansas
law. This means that each of these "interferers" may be forced into court
to "justify" his or her interference. The tortious interference claimant does
not have to offer proof that the interference was in any way improper as part
of his prima facie case; nor are there concrete rules that the defendants can
use to establish that their interference was justified.
The interference torts' must be limited in the growing trend toward
expansion of tort liability. The torts have remained undefined, creating the
danger that legitimate business practices may be deemed tortious under their
broad definition. The purpose of this Comment is to encourage Arkansas
courts to further define the tortious interference causes of action and to
suggest areas for reform of the torts. Part Two provides a summary of
tortious interference law throughout the United States, while Part Three
summarizes current Arkansas tortious interference law. Following a
discussion of current scholarship on the torts in Part Four, Part Five offers
suggestions for reformulating the interference torts in Arkansas.
1. There are two interference torts-tortious interference with a contract and tortious
interference with a business expectancy. The two are quite similar, and many courts have
combined them into one broad cause of action. See, e.g., Smith v. Ocean State Bank, 335
So. 2d 641, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) ("The only material difference appears to be that
in one there is a contract and in the other there is only a business relationship."). For
purposes of this comment, I will refer to them as the interference torts and distinguish them
only where the difference is relevant to the discussion.
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II. ToRTIous INTERFERENCE LAW IN GENERAL
A. History of the Tort
Intentional interference claims are direct descendants of Roman laws
that allowed an action against a person who physically injured any member
of a household.2 In effect, the patriarch "owned" the household members,
and an injury to one of them was an insult to the head of the family.' As
it began, the tort thus was analogous to an action in trespass.
The early British common law borrowed from Roman law in the
master-servant cases, allowing a master whose servant was violently injured
to sue the injurer for loss of services.' As a result of the post-plague labor
shortage,5 the cause of action later was expanded to include damages against
a person who induced the plaintiff's servant to leave his employ.6 The early
common law also provided landlords a remedy against anyone who induced
their tenant to leave, even though the law provided no remedy against the
tenants.7 This was the state of the law at the time that the Queen's Bench
decided Lumley v. Gye,s the case generally credited with creating the modem
tortious interference action.9
2. Francis B. Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 663 (1923).
Sayre's article is the preeminent authority regarding the early history of the interference torts.
3. Id.
4. Id. The cause of action was available only where the injurer used violence. Id.
See also Comment, Interference with Contractual & Business Relations in Alabama, 34 ALA.
L. REV. 599, 599-601 (1983).
5. See Sayre, supra note 2, at 663-65 for a discussion of the effect of the plague on
this area of the common law.
6. This tort of "enticement" referred only to employment at will situations. Donald
C. Dowling, Jr., A Contract Theory for a Complex Tort: Limiting Interference with Contract
Beyond the Unlawful Means Test, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 487, 496 (1986) (citing Note,
Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century: The
Transformation of Property, Contract, & Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1515 (1980)).
7. Id. (noting that the master-servant and landlord-tenant cases actually were tortious
interference with a business expectancy cases, pre-dating the tortious interference with a
contract action recognized in Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853)).
8. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
9. See, e.g., Benjamin L. Fine, Comment, An Analysis of the Formation of Property
Rights Underlying Tortious Interference with Contracts and Other Economic Relations, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 1116, 1116 (1983) ("The modem history of interference torts begins with the
celebrated case of Lumley v. Gye."). However, Mr. Dowling notes that 25 years prior to the
Lumley decision, an American case, Aldridge v. Stuyvesant, 1 Hall 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828),
expanded the landlord-tenant cause of action to a situation in which an enforceable contract
existed. Dowling, supra note 6, at 498-99. The Aldridge case has been overlooked by many
commentators. Dowling, supra note 6, at 499 n. 85 (commenting that Aldridge was not
mentioned in a 1924 article concerning tortious interference law in New York, the very state
where it was decided).
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Lumley extended the master-servant cause of action to cover exclusive
personal service contracts, not just master-servant relationships.10 Later
English cases further expanded the tort, relying on malice in procuring the
breach of contract to create liability." By the end of the nineteenth century,
however, courts had agreed that malice" was no longer necessary in order
to hold the defendant liable for tortious interference.
The Lumley rationale made its way into American common law, and
all fifty states currently recognize a cause of action for tortious
interference.' 3  Many of the largest awards in American commercial
litigation resulted from tortious interference claims. 4 Legal scholars from
the early twentieth century through the present have argued that the limits
of the interference torts are vague and largely undefined. 5 Although many
10. The defendant prevented an opera singer from performing at the plaintiff's theater.
The primary issue was whether the singer was a "servant" within the meaning of the common
law. However, the court found the defendant liable despite its determination that an opera
singer was not a servant. See Sayre, supra note 2, at 667-68 (citing Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep.
at 752-53).
11. Fine, supra note 9, at 1116. Temperton v. Russell, 1 Q.B. 715 (1893), made
malicious interference with a contract or business expectancy actionable. Fine, supra note
9, at 1116.
12. Malice was defined as a desire to injure the plaintiff. For an excellent discussion
of the malice requirement, see Sayre, supra note 2, at 672-86. See also 1 HARRY D. NIMS,
THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 163 (3d ed. 1979).
13. Until 1989, Louisiana did not recognize the tort; however, in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc.
v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989), the state recognized a limited interference with a
contract claim. The cause of action consists of five elements:
(1) The existence of a contract or legally protected interest between the
plaintiff and the corporation;
(2) The corporate officer's knowledge of the contract;
(3) The corporate officer's intentional inducement or causation of the
corporation to breach the contract or his intentional rendition of its
performance impossible or more burdensome;
(4) Absence of justification on the part of the officer;
(5) Causation of damages to the plaintiff by the breach of contract or difficulty
of its performance brought about by the officer.
Id. at 234. Louisiana courts have refused to extend the cause of action beyond the facts of
9 to 5 Fashions, Inc.. See Guilbeaux v. Times of Acadiana, Inc., 661 So. 2d 1027, 1033 (La.
Ct. App. 1995).
14. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)
(awarding more than $10 billion in compensatory and punitive damages for tortious
interference with a merger contract); see also Etek Awards Damages for Unfair Competition
and Tortious Interference with Contracts, COMPUTER LAW., April 1992, at 37 (discussing an
award which included punitive damages of $1.9 million).
15. See, e.g., Sayre, supra note 2, at 672. Decades after Sayre's article, the authors of
the first Restatement of Torts noted that interference law had not "fully congealed" and was
"still in its formative stages." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introductory note to ch.
37, at 5 (1977). See also Jeffrey C. Estes, Expanding Horizons in the Law of Torts-Tortious
Interference, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 341 (1974); Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract
1996]
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courts have delineated the elements of the interference torts,16 the precise
contours of those elements remain nebulous, to the dissatisfaction of most
commentators.1
7
B. Modem "Definitions" of the Tortious Interference Claim
All jurisdictions allow recovery for "intentional" interference with a
contract, 8 and most allow recovery for intentional interference with business
relations.'9  Most states have adopted a variation of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts's version of the interference with a contract tort,20 which
requires the following elements: (1) a contract existed; (2) the defendant
intentionally interfered with the performance of that contract; (3) the
interference was improper; (4) the interference was the proximate cause of
the breach or nonperformance of that contract; and (5) pecuniary damages
resulted from the breach or nonperformance. 2' Although the Restatement
requires a valid contract for recovery, under a claim for intentional
interference with a business expectancy,22 the non-existence of a contract is
and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 61, 64 (1982).
16. See infra Part B of this Comment.
17. See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34
ARK. L. REV. 335 (1980); Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and
Competition in Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097 (1993);
Perlman, supra note 15; Sayre, supra note 2; contra James V. Telfer, Comment, Interference
With Prospective Gain: Must There Be A Contract?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401 (1985).
18. See supra note 13 regarding Louisiana's limited version of the tort.
19. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129
at 978-82 (5th ed. 1984).
20. E.g., Jim Orr & Assocs., Inc. v. Waters, 299 Ark. 526, 773 S.W.2d 99 (1989);
Swartz v. Bianco Family Trust, 874 P.2d 430 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); R.T.L. Distrib., Inc. v.
Double S Batteries, Inc., 545 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); Bagwell v. Peninsula
Regional Medical Ctr., 665 A.2d 297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Beck v. American
Sharecom, Inc., 514 N.W.2d 584 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 918
P.2d 350 (N.M. 1996); Kronos, Inc. v. A.V.X. Corp., 595 N.Y.S.2d 931 (N.Y. 1993); Kenty
v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 863 (Ohio 1995); Tibke v. McDougall, 479
N.W.2d 898 (S.D. 1992); Wausau Medical Ctr. v. Asplund, 514 N.W.2d 34 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977) states the cause of action as
follows:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract... between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing
the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for
the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to
perform the contract.
The Restatement also imposes liability for interference with a party's ability to perform its
contractual duties. Id. § 766A.
22. This cause of action is also termed interference with prospective economic
[Vol. 19
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no bar to recovery.23 Several issues plague the courts in this area of law.
Among them are the required mental state for the tort, the types of
interference that are deemed "improper," the burden of proof required, and
the types of interests protected.
Most courts agree that the interference must be intentional,24 but they
do not agree on a definition of intent. At least one court has ruled that
knowledge of the existence of the contract or business expectancy is enough
to establish liability,25 but the Restatement indicates that simple knowledge
will not establish liability without a primary objective to interfere.26 Many
states follow the Restatement definition, noting that if an action is done with
knowledge or a substantial certainty that the interference will result, the
interference is deemed intentional.27 Others require a specific intent to
interfere.8
Early English and American cases required the plaintiff to prove malice
on the part of the defendant in order to recover. According to the
Restatement, the malice requirement, as stated by modem courts, does not
require ill will, only "intentional interference without justification."29 The
advantage or prospective contractual relations. A business expectancy is a business
relationship "with the probability of future economic benefit." ABA MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR BUSINESS TORT LITIGATION § 2.20 (1980). In this comment, I will refer
to the tort as interference with a business expectancy.
23. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977) states as follows:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective
contractual relation... is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm
resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference
consists of (a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or
continue the prospective relation or (b) preventing the other from acquiring or
continuing the prospective relation.
See also James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Liability for Interference with At Will Business
Relationship, 5 A.L.R. 4TH 9 (1981).
24. Generally, negligence is not enough for liability. See Fowler V. Harper,
Interference with Contractual Relations, 47 Nw. L. REv. 873, 884-93 (1953); but see J'Aire
Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979) (recognizing a negligent interference with
prospective advantage claim); John C. Smith, Negligent Interference with Contract:
Knowledge as a Standard for Recovery, 63 VA. L. REv. 813 (1977) (stating that some courts
have recognized a negligent interference claim).
25. Exxon Corp. v. Allsup, 808 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. j (1977).
27. Id. §§ 8A, 766 cmt. j. See Robin v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Co., 471
S.E.2d 294 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Nesler v. Fisher & Co., Inc., 452 N.W.2d 191 (Iowa 1990);
Willamette Quarries, Inc. v. Wodtli, 781 P.2d 1196 (Or. 1989). See also CALLMAN, UNFAIR
COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 47.3 (1982).
28. E.g., Collum v. Chapin, 671 A.2d 1329 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Macklin v. Robert
Logan Assocs., 639 A.2d 112 (Md. 1994); Foseid v. State Bank of Cross Plains, 541 N.W.2d
203 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. s (1977).
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Restatement has reformulated the malice requirement into an "improper"
interference requirement.3" Some states have defined "improper" as
wrongful means or actions taken with the objective to harm the defendant,"
but the Restatement lists factors that courts are to use in a balancing test to
determine the propriety of the interference.32 The factors allow the jury to
determine impropriety by weighing the interests of the defendant against
those of the plaintiff and society as whole. Because the factors are not
defined in concrete terms, they allow the jury to make decisions about the
impropriety of a defendant's conduct based primarily on such subjective
considerations as their feelings of affection or dislike for the defendant.
The Restatement allocates the burden of proof to the plaintiff, requiring
proof that the interference was both intentional and improper.33 A majority
of jurisdictions agree.34 However, in a minority of jurisdictions, including
30. Id. § 766. The first Restatement required proof that the defendant "purposely
interfered" with the plaintiff's contract, but the second Restatement changed that requirement
-to "intentionally and improperly interfered." See id. § 766, Reporter's Note.
31. See, e.g., Frontier Cos. v. Jack White Co., 818 P.2d 645 (Alaska 1991); Amoco Oil
Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1995); Downey Chiropractic Clinic v. Nampa Restaurant
Corp., 900 P.2d 191 (Idaho 1995).
32. The factors are as follows:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct;
(b) the actor's motive;
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes;
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor;
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interests of the other;
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference; and
(g) the relations between the parties.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1977). Factor (g) concerns not only the personal
relationship between the parties, but also the type of relation with which the defendant
allegedly interfered, whether an existing or prospective contract.
33. Prosser and Keeton interpret the Restatement as placing the burden of proof on the
plaintiff. KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, § 129 at 983-84. While the language of
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 766 and 767 appears to place the burden of proof on the
plaintiff, comment b to § 767 indicates that courts disagree regarding allocation of the burden
of proof. The comment still advises the plaintiffs to allege both intentional and improper
interference. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. b (1977).
34. See, e.g., Marshall v. Munro, 845 P.2d 424 (Alaska 1993); Boettcher D.T.C. Bldg.
Joint Venture v. Falcon Ventures, 762 P.2d 788 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Golembeski v.
Metichewan Grange No. 190, 569 A.2d 1157 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990); Robin v. Bellsouth
Advertising & Publishing Co., 471 S.E.2d 294 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Weinberg v. Mauch, 890
P.2d 277 (Haw. 1995); Short v. Haywood Printing Co., 667 N.E.2d 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996);
Berger v. Cas' Feed Store, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 597 (Iowa 1996); National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Hornung, 754 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1988); Clement v. Rev-Lyn Contracting Co., 663
N.E.2d 1235 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); Bonelli v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 421 N.W.2d
213 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Capobianco v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 812 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991); Hroch v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 548 N.W.2d 367 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996); Kelly
v. St. Vincent Hosp., 692 P.2d 1350 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); Carolina Water Serv. v. Atlantic
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Arkansas, the plaintiff is required only to show that a contract or business
expectancy existed and the defendant intended to interfere with that
interest.35 The burden of persuasion then shifts to the defendant to prove
some "justification" for his or her actions as an affirmative defense to
liability.
3 6
The intentional interference with business expectancy claim is subject
to a broader range of justifications. For example, according to the
Restatement, one may interfere with a competitor's business expectancy, but
not the competitor's contract, for the purpose of legitimate competition.37
However, some justifications apply to either type of intentional interference
tort.38 For example, under the Restatement formulation, no actor is held
liable for the ramifications of giving truthful information or honest advice
upon request39 or for asserting a bona fide legally protected claim of his or
her own.4"
Courts also differ as to the requirement of an enforceable contract.
Many jurisdictions, including Arkansas,41 allow a recovery for tortious
interference withan unenforceable contract on an interference with business
Beach, 464 S.E.2d 317 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. v. Vernon Klein
Truck & Equip., 919 P.2d 443 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994); Willamette Dental Group, P.C. v.
Oregon Dental Serv. Corp., 882 P.2d 637 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 829 P.2d 142 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Ames v. Sundance State Bank, 850 P.2d 607
(Wyo. 1993).
35. See, e.g., Pegram v. Hebding, 667 So. 2d 696 (Ala. 1995); Cooke v. Griffiths-Garcia
Corp., 612 A.2d 1251 (D.C. 1992); Baker v. Dennis Brown Realty, Inc., 433 A.2d 1271
(N.H. 1981); Jolicoeur Furniture Co., Inc. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d 740 (R.I. 1995); Texas Beef
Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1996); Fox v. Deese, 362 S.E.2d 699 (Va. 1987);
C.W. Dev., Inc. v. Structures, Inc., 408 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1991). This form of recovery is
similar to the prima facie tort. For discussion of the prima facie tort doctrine, see Kenneth
J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General Theory of
Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 447 (1990).
36. See, e.g., Alfred Altimont, Inc. v. Chatelain, Samperton & Nolan, 374 A.2d 284
(D.C. 1977); Furlev Sales & Assocs. v. North Am. Automotive Warehouse, Inc., 325 N.W.2d
20 (Minn. 1982); Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1986); Collins v.
Greene County Bank, 916 S.W.2d 941 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1977). See also § 769 (stating that
one who has a financial interest in a third person's business is privileged to interfere with the
third person's business expectancy); § 771 (stating that one who acts with the purpose of
influencing a third person's business policy is privileged to interfere with that person's
business expectancy).
38. See, e.g., id. § 770 (one who is charged with the responsibility of a third person
may cause that person not to perform a contract or not to continue a business expectancy if
he or she acts to protect the welfare of that third person).
39. Id. § 772. See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of
the interaction of First Amendment protections and the interference torts.
40. Id. § 773.
41. See Fisher v. Jones, 311 Ark. 450, 844 S.W.2d 954 (1993).
1996]
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expectancy theory.42 Others require the existence of a valid and enforceable
contract for both theories.43 For example, New York does not allow a
plaintiff to recover for interference with an unenforceable contract unless
there is a showing of "wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack
of competitive motive." 44 In general, plaintiffs can also maintain a cause of
action based on a contract that is terminable at will.45 Most of the litigation
in this area is based on at will employment contracts. 6
42. See, e.g., Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1994)
(finding that a contract is not necessary, "existing or prospective legal or contractual rights,"
is sufficient); Allen v. Leybourne, 190 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (allowing a
claim of tortious interference with a contract that was void for lack of consideration);
Daugherty v. Kessler, 286 A.2d 95 (Md. 1972); Northern Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v.
Henderson Bros., 268 N.W.2d 296 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (finding liability based on a
contract which was unenforceable under the statute of frauds). See also Bynum v. Bynum,
531 P.2d 618 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); A.C.S. Investors, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 913 S.W.2d 664
(Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
43. See, e.g., Dolton v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 642 P.2d 21 (Colo. Ct. App.
1981) (denying interference claim based on a contract which was unenforceable under the
statute of frauds); William S. Deckelbaum Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the
United States, 419 N.E.2d 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that Indiana requires a valid
existing contract as the basis for a claim, and the plaintiff cannot recover under a business
expectancy cyaim); Malevich v. Hakola, 278 N.W.2d 541 (Minn. 1979) (stating that if
essential ternis are missing then there can be no interference with the contract).
44. Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445, 450 (N.Y.
1980).
45. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Aurora Air Serv., Inc., 604 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1979);
Bar J Bar Cattle Co. v. Pace, 763 P.2d 545 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Greenberg v. Mount Sinai
Medical Ctr., 629 So.2d 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Moore v. Barge, 436 S.E.2d 746 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1993); Anderson v. Anchor Org. for Health Maintenance, 654 N.E.2d 675 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1995); Computers Unlimited, Inc. v. Midwest Data Sys., Inc., 657 N.E.2d 165 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995); Macklin v. Robert Logan Assocs., 639 A.2d 112 (Md. 1994); Patillo v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 502 N.W.2d 696 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Murray
v. Ray, 862 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); State Medical Oxygen & Supply, Inc. v.
American Medical Oxygen Co., 883 P.2d 1241 (Mont. 1994); Hoschler v. Kozlik, 529
N.W.2d 822 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995); Avtec Indus., Inc. v. Sony Corp., 500 A.2d 712 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Kelly v. St. Vincent Hosp., 692 P.2d 1350 (N.M. Ct. App.
1984); Home Town Muffler, Inc. v. Cole Muffler, Inc., 608 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994); Lenzer v. Flaherty, 418 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); Hennum v. City of Medina,
402 N.W.2d 327 (N.D. 1987); Sheets v. Knight, 779 P.2d 1000 (Or. 1989); Curran v.
Children's Serv. Ctr., Inc., 578 A.2d 8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Roy v. Woonsocket Inst. for
Savings, 525 A.2d 915 (R.I. 1987); Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 321
S.E.2d 602 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984), quashed on other grounds, 336 S.E.2d 472 (S.C. 1985);
Massey v. Houston Baptist Univ., 902 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995); Murray v. St.
Michael's College, 667 A.2d 294 (Vt. 1995).
46. See, e.g., Patillo v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 502
N.W.2d 696 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Lenzer v. Flaherty, 418 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. Ct. App.
1992); Curran v. Children's Serv. Ctr., Inc., 578 A.2d 8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
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C. The Special Case of Employment At Will
Many courts treat interference with employment at will cases as
intentional interference with business expectancy claims, thus giving the
defendants the benefit of expanded justifications. For example, competition
is deemed a permissible justification for interference with a business
expectancy.47 However, Arkansas law does not appear to allow this
privilege in employment cases.48
In jurisdictions like Arkansas, a strong commitment to the employment
at will doctrine is inconsistent with allowing recovery for interference with
an at will employment contract. Arkansas is an employment at will state,
and without a contract for employment of a specified duration, the courts are
emphatic that there can be no claim of wrongful discharge against an
employer.49 Because of its commitment to the employment at will doctrine,
the Arkansas Supreme Court will not imply a contract provision limiting an
employer's right to terminate his or her employee at will. ° Indeed, the
court has recognized exceptions to the employment at will doctrine only for
cases in which the employee is discharged (1) for refusing to violate a
criminal statute; (2) for exercising a statutory right; (3) for complying with
a statutory duty; and (4) in violation of the general public policy of the
state."' Allowing a tortious interference claim based upon an at will
employment contract undermines the public policy of states such as
Arkansas by allowing a "back door" claim for wrongful termination.
Although an employee cannot sue his or her employer for wrongful
termination, Arkansas allows the employee to sue the person who allegedly
persuaded the employer to terminate the employment. Ironically, the
employer has a right to terminate employment for any or no reason is
protected from liability, while the person who gives the employer advice is
held liable. 2 If no liability arises from termination without the advice or
encouragement of a third party, no liability should arise with that advice or
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1977).
48. See infra note 82-83 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Bryant v. Southern Screw Mach. Prods. Co., 288 Ark. 602, 603, 707
S.W.2d 321, 322 (1986).
50. Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hosp., 292 Ark. 130, 136, 728 S.W.2d 501, 505
(1987) (stating that the court would uphold an employment contract or personnel manual with
an express provision limiting the employer's right to discharge but would not imply such a
provision); see also Proctor v. East Cent. Ark. EOC, 291 Ark. 265, 724 S.W.2d 163 (1987).
51. City of Green Forest v. Morse, 316 Ark. 540, 546, 873 S.W.2d 155, 158 (1994)
(quoting Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 245, 743 S.W.2d 380, 383 (1988)).
See also Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487, 494 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
52. See, e.g., Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 526-28, 446 S.W.2d 543, 546-48
(1969).
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consent." If employment at will states like Arkansas want to allow a cause
of action for wrongful termination, they should allow employees to sue the
employers themselves. 4 Otherwise, the courts should not allow plaintiffs
to disguise a wrongful termination suit as a tortious interference claim."
In addition, employers who have the power to terminate an employee
at will should have no claim against someone who hires away their
employees unless the third party uses illegal or tortious means to do so. To
allow an employer to sue for tortious interference with an at will employ-
ment situation provides the employer the protection of a "contract" without
contractual duties or liability.
5 6
III. ToRTIous INTERFERENCE LAW IN ARKANSAS
Arkansas can trace its tortious interference cause of action to an 1897
case, Dale v. Hall,57 which held that a tenant in common was liable to his
co-tenant for wrongfully inducing lessees to leave before the expiration of
their lease.5 8 Building on the Dale decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court
allowed its first "tortious interference" claim in Mahoney v. Roberts."
Roberts, the plaintiff, and Mahoney, the defendant, were partners who
agreed to dissolve their partnership. For consideration of $500, Mahoney
agreed not to compete with Roberts in their hometown. According to the
court, Mahoney then "conspired" to do business under his son's name, Frank
Collins.60 Because Collins and Mahoney's wife had assisted Mahoney in his
breach of the covenant not to compete, Roberts sued them for tortious
interference with his contract. To establish liability, the court required
Roberts to prove that the assistance of Mrs. Mahoney and Collins was given
53. Of course, if the third party interferes with the employment relationship by illegal
or independently tortious means, the employee should have the right to pursue independent
claims against the party.
54. See also Gary Minda, The Common Law of Employment-At-Will in New York: The
Paralysis of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REv. 939 (1985) (discussing the
clash between tortious interference claims and the employment-at will doctrine).
55. See, e.g., Eggleston v. Phillips, 838 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that
a claim of tortious interference with an employment at will relationship is the equivalent of
a wrongful discharge action); Miller v. Richman, 592 N.Y.S.2d 201, 202 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992) ("Plaintiff cannot circumvent the employment at will rule by asserting causes of action
for defamation, injurious falsehood and tortious interference with her employment.").
56. See Defco v. Decatur Cylinder, Inc., 595 So. 2d 1329, 1331-32 (Ala. 1992)
(allowing no claim for hiring another company's at will employees in the absence of a
covenant not to compete).
57. 64 Ark. 221, 41 S.W. 761 (1897).
58. Id. at 223-26, 41 S.W. at 761-62.
59. 86 Ark. 130, 110 S.W. 225 (1908).
60. Id. at 136, 110 S.W. at 227.
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"with the intent to injure [Roberts]" or "for the purpose of obtaining some
benefit for themselves at [Robert's] expense, or .. . to his injury." 61
Mahoney, his wife, and his son were together held liable for $475 in
damages.
62
Since Mahoney, the Arkansas Supreme Court has steadily expanded the
tort. Currently, in order to prove a prima facie case of tortious interference
with a contract or business expectancy, a plaintiff must prove the following
elements: (1) the plaintiff has a valid contract or business expectancy; (2)
the defendant knew of the contract or business expectancy; (3) the defendant
intentionally interfered with and induced the breach or termination of the
contract or expectancy; and (4) the interference damaged the plaintiff.63
In order to prove the first element in a tortious interference with a
contract claim, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a valid, enforceable
contract.64 However, even if the plaintiff has no cause of action for breach
of contract against the terminating party, a defendant who induced the
termination, nevertheless, may be held liable for tortious interference with
the contract. 65 Thus, a defendant may be held liable for tortious interference
with a terminable at will employment contract.66 In addition, the plaintiff
can maintain an interference with a business expectancy claim even though
the underlying contract is ruled invalid.67  The second element simply
requires actual knowledge of the contract or business expectancy at the time
the defendant committed the interfering conduct.68
In addition, the plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that because of the defendant's intentional conduct, a contract
between the plaintiff and a third party which would otherwise have been
performed was not performed or was made more burdensome. This
necessarily encompasses a causation requirement. For example, in Jim Orr
& Associates, Inc. v. Waters,69 the trial court ruled that Jim Orr and
Associates suffered no damages because of the defendant's interference.
The plaintiff, Waters, sold his life insurance business to Jim Orr and
61. Id. at 139, 110 S.W. at 228.
62. Id. at 135, 110 S.W. at 227.
63. Mid-South Beverages, Inc. v. Forrest City Grocery Co., 300 Ark. 204, 205, 778
S.W.2d 218, 219 (1989) (citing Walt Bennett Ford v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 274
Ark. 208, 214, 624 S.W.2d 426, 429 (1981)).
64. See Fisher v. Jones, 311 Ark. 450, 455, 844 S.W.2d 954, 957 (1993).
65. Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 528, 446 S.W.2d 543, 547 (1969).
66. Id. See also supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text discussing employment at
will contracts.
67. Fisher, 311 Ark. at 455, 844 S.W.2d at 957.
68. Id. at 455-56, 844 S.W.2d at 957-58; United Bilt Homes, Inc. v. Sampson, 310 Ark.
47, 51, 832 S.W.2d 502, 504 (1992).
69. 299 Ark. 526, 773 S.W.2d 99 (1989).
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Associates. Waters's former business manager, Brown, remained with the
company after it was sold. While in Jim Orr's employment, Brown wrote
letters to various life insurance agents asking that they sign a statement
saying David Huso was their "agent of record." A dispute arose between
Waters and Jim Orr, and Waters filed suit. Jim Orr filed a third party
complaint against Brown and Huso for tortious interference with its agents'
contracts. The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that Orr had suffered no
damages since all of the agents who terminated their contracts said they did
so because of dissatisfaction with Orr's services.7" Cases such as Jim Orr
and others indicate that "but for" causation is required.7' In Arkansas,
breach of the underlying contract is not necessary, however, even in a
tortious interference with a contract claim. Liability may attach if the
"contract performance is partly or wholly prevented, or made less valuable,
or more burdensome by the defendant's unjustified conduct."72
No Arkansas cases have addressed the required intent in the interfer-
ence context. A federal court applying Arkansas law, however, required
evidence that the defendant desired to harm the plaintiff or knew his or her
actions were reasonably certain to result in the breach or termination of the
contract or expectancy.73 Originally, malice was an essential part of the
plaintiffs case in the intentional interference with a contract claim. Later
cases did away with the malice requirement; the plaintiff must no longer
prove an improper motive or bad faith.74 According to a recent case,
Arkansas requires that the interference be "improper" in order to be
actionable, but the defendant has the burden of proving the propriety of his
actions.7 The court in Fisher v. Jones favorably quoted section 767 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which lists the factors to determine if an
interference is improper; however, the court provided no analysis of the
70. Id. at 531, 773 S.W.2d at 102.
71. See, e.g., Duncan v. Foster, 271 Ark. 591, 609 S.W.2d 62 (1980); Eagle Properties,
Inc. v. West & Co., 242 Ark. 184, 412 S.W.2d 605 (1967).
72. United Bilt Homes, Inc., 310 Ark. at 52, 832 S.W.2d at 504; see also Mason v.
Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 446 S.W.2d 543 (1969) (discussing tortious interference with
employment at will relationship). Termination of an at will contract will never result in an
action for breach against the terminating party, yet Arkansas courts recognize an action
against third parties for tortious interference with an at will contract.
73. City Nat'l Bank v. Unique Structures, Inc., 929 F.2d 1308, 1316 (8th Cir. 1991).
74. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 274 Ark. 208, 214A,
624 S.W.2d 426, 429 (1981) (supplemental opinion upon denial of petition for rehearing).
75. See Fisher v. Jones,'311 Ark. 450, 458-59, 844 S.W.2d 954, 959 (1993). A fair
reading of the Fisher case indicates that a defendant is responsible for showing the propriety
of his conduct by proving either that his conduct was "proper" or "privileged." See id. One
might assume that once a defendant makes a showing of propriety or privilege, the burden
of persuasion on the issue of impropriety then shifts to the plaintiff, but the cases do not state
this rule.
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factors and did not apply them to the facts of the case.76 The Fisher case
is the only Arkansas case which cites this Restatement section; thus, there
is no indication of how Arkansas courts will apply the factors. It appears
that a defendant must prove his interference was "proper" as an affirmative
defense to the tortious interference claim by using these malleable factors.
In addition to proving his interference was proper, a defendant may
also argue that his interference was justified or privileged. Arkansas
recognizes a privilege to interfere with the contractual or business relations
of another in order to protect a third party for whom the interferer is
responsible.77 In Conway Corp. v. Construction Engineers, Inc.,78 the
defendant's employees investigated the plaintiff and received negative
reports on his work. Based on this investigation, they advised the
company's board not to award a construction contract to the plaintiff, and
the board followed that advice. The court found this interference privileged
because the employees were acting to protect their employer.79
In Stebbins & Roberts, Inc. v. Halsey,"0 the Arkansas Supreme Court
ruled that a defendant who is acting to protect his own financial interest is
privileged to prevent the performance of another's contract if it threatens
this interest." The Stebbins & Roberts case is also the only Arkansas case
which addresses the privilege of competition. In it, the court noted that an
"existing contract takes precedence over any interest in unrestricted
competition."" Thus, Arkansas obviously does not recognize a competition
privilege for interference with an existing contract. Likewise, Arkansas has
not yet recognized a competition privilege for interference with a business
expectancy, although the supreme court has not expressly rejected the
privilege.
IV. SCHOLARSHIP ON THE INTERFERENCE TORTS
The academic commentary on the interference torts generally concerns
two categories---contracts and business expectancies as property interests
and the economic consequences of the interference torts. Many commenta-
tors focus on the issue of a contract as a property right, and in fact, many
courts agree that, at least in the tortious interference context, a contract right
76. See id. at 458-59, 844 S.W.2d at 959.
77. Walt Bennett Ford, 274 Ark. at 214-B, 624 S.W.2d at 430.
78. 300 Ark. 225, 782 S.W.2d 36 (1989).
79. Id. at 233, 782 S.W.2d at 40.
80. 265 Ark. 903, 582 S.W.2d 266 (1979).
81. Id. at 906, 582 S.W.2d at 267 (quoting PROSSER, TORTS § 129 (4th ed. 1971)).
82. Id. (quoting PROSSER, TORTS § 129 (4th ed. 1971)).
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is a property right. 83  Richard Epstein, for example, argues that the
interference with a contract tort fits within the framework of "torts
governing the takings of property."'  He analyzes each element of the
tortious interference claim in terms of the property concept of "ostensible
ownership,"85 arguing that the concept of notice is the key to determining
whether an interferer should be held liable.
86
Benjamin Fine takes a unique approach to the interference torts by
comparing them to the law involving the pursuit of wild animals.8 7 He
discusses two "intermediate" levels of property rights; the first he analogizes
to tortious interference with a business expectancy. The hunter who is
merely pursuing wild animals has no property right in the animal itself; the
hunter does have a right, however, to "free pursuit" of the animal.
88
Therefore, anyone who wrongfully interferes with the hunter's free pursuit
should be liable for that interference. 89  The only interferers who escape
liability in the hunting hypothetical are other hunters pursuing the same
animal "by means not otherwise tortious."9  This theory of liability is
similar to a claim for tortious interference with a business expectancy.91
Second, after the hunter has acquired "physical control" over the
animal, she has the right of "exclusive pursuit., 92  This situation is
83. See, e.g., Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 526, 446 S.W.2d 543, 546-47 (1969);
Central Bank v. Shackleford, 896 S.W.2d 948, 954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Love v. Gamble,
448 S.E.2d 876, 882 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994); Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (Va.
1985).
84. Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible
Ownership, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1987). These torts are "conversion," "trespass to
goods," "dispossession," and "recovery of land." Id.
85. See id. at 21-29.
86. Id. at 2-3. The "ostensible ownership" issue arises when the possessor of property
behaves as if she owned the property and enters into a transaction with a third party. The
third party is protected in this circumstance only if he had notice that the possessor was not
the owner. Id. Presumably, under Epstein's model, mere knowledge of the contract's
existence would be a sufficient basis upon which to impose liability upon the interferer.
87. Fine, supra note 9, at 1124.
88. Fine, supra note 9, at 1128-29. Fine discusses three property cases: Pierson v.
Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Young v. Hichens, 115 Eng. Rep. 228 (1844); and
Keeble v. Hickeringill, 91 Eng. Rep. 659 (K.B. 1707).
89. Fine, supra note 9, at 1128-29.
90. Fine, supra note 9, at 1128.
91. Fine, supra note 9, at 1136. In order to be held liable, the interferer must know of
the existence of the expectancy and have no commercial justification for her interference.
Fine, supra note 9, at 1136.
92. Fine, supra note 9, at 1129-30. Fine uses whaling cases to illustrate this concept.
Once the whale is harpooned, the sailors acquired an exclusive right to finish the job of
killing the whale. Anyone who interfered with that right was liable for interference with the
killing. Fine, supra note 9, at 1130 (citing Littledale v. Smith, 127 Eng. Rep. 826 (York
Assizes 1788); Hogarth v. Jackson, 172 Eng. Rep. 271 (C.P. 1827)).
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analogous to the businessperson who has entered into a contract with
another. While, under Fine's theory, the contract does not give a party a
property interest in the contract's performance, it gives the party an
"exclusive right to pursue that performance free from interference." 93
While Epstein and Fine identify a theoretical basis for the interference
torts in property law, Dan Dobbs rejects the contract as property analysis. 94
According to Dobbs, making a contract into a property right is fundamen-
tally unfair because it allows the contracting parties to bind others to an
agreement they created. 95 "[I]f A and B may by a legal action between
them in court or in a contract proscribe legal rights of T, then something is
very wrong in the state of the law."96  Dobbs argues that a transfer of
property rights does not affect the rights of third parties with regard to that
property because third parties' rights regarding property are always
constrained and no new legal constraints are created by the transfer. In
contrast, if contracts are treated as property, each new contract creates a new
constraint on third parties.97
Dobbs also rejects the notion that contracts are the equivalent of
intangible property rights such as copyrights and patents.98 The primary
difference is that while intangible property rights may not be taken and used
by another, no third party is prevented from negotiating within the market
regarding the use of that property.99  Thus, the third party's freedom of
action within the market is not inhibited.
The property commentators do not argue that a contract is actually the
equivalent of property; they merely contend that property law provides a
more appropriate framework for justifying the tortious interference torts. As
any first year law student knows, there is a difference between contracts and
property. Posner and Landes might define the difference in terms of
"property rights" versus "liability rules."' 00 Under Posner and Landes's
somewhat simplistic, but useful, definitions, one who owns a property right
has the right to prevent anyone from using or enjoying that property
regardless of the third party's justification, and, with some notable
93. Fine, supra note 9, at 1137.
94. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 350-56.
95. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 350-51.
96. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 350-51.
97. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 350-51. According to the contract as property theory,
when X agrees to buy widgets from Y, Z will no longer have the right to make X a better
deal on widgets.
98. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 352-53.
99. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 353.
100. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 29-31 (1987). While Posner and Landes do not contrast property rights with contract
rights, their definitions may be applied to the contract/property distinction.
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exceptions, without regard to society's best interest.'0 ' A liability rule does
not give one the right to "exclude" others; it merely provides a right to seek
damages after some harm has occurred. 2 The authors use an example of
a pedestrian who is run down by a car. The pedestrian has no right to
prevent the car from hitting her, so she has no property right in the freedom
from injury. She has a liability right, however, to seek compensation for her
injures after she is run over.'0 3
A contract, by definition, is merely a promise for which the law
provides some protection in the form of a remedy for its breach." 4
Therefore, it seems to fit best under Posner and Landes's "liability rule" as
opposed to a "property right."' ' A contract right is based on the parties'
consent to constrain their own freedom, while the foundation of a property
right is the ability to constrain others without regard to their consent.'0 6
The debate over whether a contract is a property right may be more
semantics than substance. The answer as to whether a contract is a property
interest lies in the context. In the tortious interference context, the
protection a contract is given makes a it closely akin to a property right.
This observation, however, offers no solution regarding how, or whether, to
limit the interference torts. While the property/contract debate seems best
suited for determining whether there should be protection at all, the
economic efficiency analysis lends itself to a discussion of the limits of that
liability.
If it is appropriate to treat a contract as a property interest worthy of
protection under the tort law, then the limits of that protection must be clear
in order to promote economic efficiency. The contract is protected in order
to provide some stability in the market place because if market participants
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 30.
104. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 defines a contract as "a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the
law in some way recognizes as a duty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
Black's Law Dictionary defines a contract as "a promise or set of promises constituting an
agreement between the parties that gives each a legal duty to the other and also the right to
seek a remedy for the breach of those duties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 224 (Abridged
6th ed. 1991).
105. Note, however, that Posner and Landes contend that only the invasion of a property
right gives rise to the right to collect punitive damages. POSNER & LANDES, supra note 100,
at 30. This statement leads to the somewhat confusing conclusion, under the Posner/Landes
analysis, that while a contract is not property, the right to prevent others from interfering
with that contract may be a property right. Curiously, the law seems to give the right to
avoid interference more protection than the contract itself.
106. Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and
Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REv. 389, 394 (1993).
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cannot count on contracts to remain stable, then the market becomes weak
and fails. However, the market also requires some "freedom of movement"
for its participants in order to remain strong. Obviously, freedom of choice
is essential in a capitalist economy where competition reigns supreme. The
issue becomes then, how to come to a balance between the two seemingly
polarized needs of the market-individual freedom and stability of
relationships.
Economic efficiency theorists are concerned primarily with the potential
for the interference torts to undermine the Posnerian model of economically
efficient breaches." 7 A breach of contract is efficient when the breaching
party is able to pay full damages to the other party, yet still gain economi-
cally from the breach. When X and Y sign a contract for the sale of goods
or services, one can assume that their agreement is the best deal either one
could find because if there had been a better deal available, then one of
them would have taken it. If, after signing the contract, X receives
information that another party, Z, will pay more for the goods or services,
then X will decide to breach the contract with Y only if the new transaction
with Z will give her enough money to pay contract damages to Y and still
enjoy a profit on the sale. Through this process, society receives a great
benefit because its resources flow to those who value them the most, and
other market participants will not be hurt by the reallocation of those
resources as long as the promisee, Y in the above hypothetical, receives
compensatory damages for the promisor's breach.'08
The efficient breach theory makes the incorrect assumption that there
are no transaction costs, such as the expenses of litigating or settling the
breach of contract issue, involved in the above hypothetical. It also assumes
that a party's general reputation within the business community will
withstand frequent decisions to breach contracts, no matter how efficient
those decisions may be. Despite these problems underlying the theory, the
decisions that American law makers have made regarding the appropriate
measure of contract damages follow the efficiency theory."° And, although
commentators sometimes disagree about which combination of damage
107. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 4 (3d ed. 1986).
108. For a basic discussion of the efficient breach concept, see Majorie Kornhauser, An
Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683
(1986).
109. According to Justice Holmes, a contract is merely a "prediction that if a man does
or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this way or that by judgment of the
court." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897),
quoted in Dowling, supra note 6, at 506. The overwhelming majority of courts decline to
award punitive damages for a breach of contract. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 520 (2d ed. 1977).
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awards is the most efficient,"10 virtually all accept the goal of economic
efficiency as a primary objective in the law of contract damages."'
One can also apply the efficiency theory to business expectancies. If
the business relationship satisfies the business needs of the two people or
entities involved and "maximizes" each party's "expected gains," then the
relationship will continue." 2 The market is strengthened by strong and
efficient business relationships, and the termination of inefficient relation-
ships serves the same purpose within the market as the termination of
inefficient contracts.' 
13
According to Harvey Perlman, "[i]f allocational efficiency is the
objective of contract law, legal rules should encourage persons to search for
and to take advantage of more highly valued uses for resources under their
command.""' 4 Tortious interference liability works counter to the efficient
breach theory by discouraging third parties from offering better deals to
those who have already entered into contracts."' Inducer liability adds a
transaction cost to the decision of whether to offer another a more
advantageous business opportunity. Just as attorneys' fees, costs of
litigation, and damage to reputation impacted the breaching party's decision
to breach, inducer liability prevents the "economic efficiency ideal" from
working effectively in the "real" business world. The impact can be
enormous because the interference torts can lead to awards of punitive
damages.
Gary Myers argues that penalties for tortious interference are "unrea-
sonable unless every breach [of contract] is viewed as undesirable.""' 6 A
breach of contract may seem "immoral" to some people, but it remains a
necessary aspect of the efficient allocation of resources in a capitalist market
110. See, e.g., John A. Sebert, Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages In Actions Based
Upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1565 (1986); Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and
the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981); Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the
Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443
(1980).
111. See authorities cited at supra note 110 and John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of
Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972).
112. Perlman, supra note 15, at 89-90. "Only when some more advantageous
opportunity arises will a party sever or avoid the relationship." Perlman, supra note 15, at
90.
113. Perlman, supra note 15, at 90.
114. Perlman, supra note 15, at 82-83.
115. Perlman, supra note 15, at 83. "Contract rules seem designed to facilitate breach
where efficiency gains result; the inducer liability rule, in contrast, seems designed to reduce
the number of such breaches and thus runs counter to a plausible objective of contract
doctrine." Perlman, supra note 15, at 83.
116. Myers, supra note 17, at 1119.
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economy. Furthermore, as Myers argues, instead of imposing inducer
liability, awarding specific performance for every breach of contract is a far
better method of deeming all breaches undesirable. 17 Implementing this
solution essentially prohibits any party from breaching his contract. Perhaps
those who advocate treating contracts as property would find this solution
palatable.'1
Contrary to the arguments of Dobbs and Myers, Donald Dowling
argues that the presence of tortious interference liability will encourage all
breaches, efficient and inefficient, because the breaching party knows that
the inducer is just as likely to get sued as she.' Because the tortious
interference claim, presumably, was designed to discourage breaches, this
result is undesirable in the context of both contract and tort law. Dowling
uses his theory to argue the somewhat unusual proposition that tortious
interference with contract claims should be disallowed entirely.
120
Perhaps the most practical application of the "efficient breach" theory
to the interference torts is found in two pages of Dan Dobbs's 1980
article.' 2' For Dobbs, the efficient breach theory is useful primarily because
it reenforces the notion that some breaches are good for society, and,
therefore, not all breaches should result in liability for tortious
interference. 2 2 Dobbs proposes to limit liability for interference to those
cases where "wrongful means" are employed.
23
In the discussion of society's interest in the efficient allocation of
resources, one must not overlook society's interest in promoting the stability
of contractual relationships. In a capitalist market, participants must be able
to depend on the stability of their contracts in order to facilitate "bargained
117. Myers, supra note 17, at 1120.
118. If, as Posner and Landes suggest, ownership of "property" gives one the right to
prevent any harm to that property, then awarding specific performance for every breach
would be consistent with the notion of contract as property.
119. Dowling, supra note 6, at 508. Dowling concludes that potential tort liability will
not discourage interferers from offering more advantageous business opportunities because
the number of "successful interference cases in society is probably low enough to make the
odds of any single plaintiff filing a claim too idiosyncratic to measure." Dowling, supra note
6, at 508. This may no longer be the case ten years later. Judging from the amount of new
case law in existence, tortious interference claims are on the rise.
120. Dowling, supra note 6, at 514-19.
121. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 360-61.
122. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 361.
123. Dobbs specifically defines "wrongful means" in his recommendations for limiting
the interference torts. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 365-76. Among the "wrongful means" are
acts which are independently tortious, "non-tortious misconduct" such as duress, undue
influence, and breach of fiduciary duty, and "misuse of economic power" through boycotts
or restraints of trade. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 365-68.
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for exchanges" within the economy. 24 According to John Danforth, contract
remedies do not discourage breaches; they merely compensate for them after
they have occurred.1 25 Thus, the presence of the interference with a contract
tort provides a necessary deterrent absent in conventional contract law.
26
The law in California emphasizes the protection of market stability.
California treats tortious interference with a contract as a subcategory of
"tortious interference with prospective gain."'127 Defendants are held liable
for all foreseeable harm which results from their actions; the California
courts have even recognized a cause of action for negligent interference with
a prospective advantage.121 In California, the courts use tortious interference
law to "insur[e] a minimal level of ethical behavior in the marketplace."'129
The California approach may provide market stability at the expense of
competition, which is inhibited by "restrict[ing] free[dom of] movement in
the marketplace."' 30 There is a fundamental tension between stability of
contractual and business relations and freedom of competition. Breaches
that occur as a result of interference through "improper means" or with
"improper motives" promote inefficient reallocation of resources because it
is the wrongful act, not the market itself, which causes the reallocation. In
contrast, breaches that occur through proper means or with proper motive
are efficient. The breacher makes her decision to breach based on market
considerations and is not coerced into the decision by the wrongful act of
another. Wrongful interference distorts the market.
124. John Danforth, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society's
Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1491, 1511
(1981).
125. Id. at 1511.
126. Id.
Tort protection against interference with contract promotes society's interest in
commercial stability in two areas not adequately protected by the existence of
traditional remedies against breach. First, and most obviously, the tort may
encourage the formation of some contracts by giving a promisee's interests added
protection. Second, and most importantly, the mere existence of tortious
interference liability articulates society's interest in contractual integrity, and thus
augments the extent to which existing contracts will appear reliable and will tend
to structure a market economy.
Id. at 1511 (internal citations omitted).
127. Telfer, supra note 17, at 407.
128. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
129. Telfer, supra note 17, at 411.
130. Gina M. Grothe, Interference with Contract in the Competitive Marketplace, 15 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 453, 458 (1989).
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V. REFORMULATING THE TORT IN ARKANSAS
The arguments of the economic efficiency theorists are convincing.
Competition, as the basis for the American market economy, should have
extensive protection under the laws. While some interference liability may
be necessary to promote ethical practices in the market and to ensure
stability of business relationships, the interference torts, as they are currently
formulated in states like Arkansas, have too much potential to stifle
competition.
Consider the following hypothetical. Sam uses a large quantity of
widgets in her business and always buys them from the XYZ Widget Store.
I sell widgets, and I am aware that Sam needs them. I know that she must
be buying widgets from someone because she is using them in her business;
nevertheless, I come into Sam's office and offer her the widget deal of a
lifetime. I can sell her widgets for a lower price than any other widget
manufacturer in America. 13  Having no contract with the XYZ Widget
Store, Sam decides to buy widgets from my company, the Widgets-4-U
Corporation. For this action, even though I have induced Sam to do nothing
illegal and have used no wrongful means to induce her action, I am prima
facie liable in Arkansas.13 1 If the state recognizes competition as a
justification for interference, the XYZ Widget Store may not succeed on its
claim. 133 However, if this claim arises in a state such as Arkansas which
makes intentional interference prima facie actionable, the XYZ Widget Store
will be able to force me into expensive litigation to prove my competitive
motive and to disprove any other motive I might have.'34 Furthermore, even
though under Arkansas law, I am not liable if my interference is "proper,"
the case law does not define proper in concrete terms. Because I have no
notice of the types of interference that are "improper," I have no way to
conform my actions to avoid liability completely unless I avoid soliciting
potential customers in the market.
In order to avoid the problems illustrated by the above hypothetical,
Arkansas should modify its tortious interference cause of action in two
ways. First, it should require the plaintiff to plead and prove improper
131. Assume, for purposes of this hypothetical, that I am truthful as we are not
discussing fraud or any other independently tortious means.
132. See elements of the prima facie case in Arkansas, supra notes 63-82 and
accompanying text.
133. Arkansas has not recognized the competition privilege. See supra notes 80-82 and
accompanying text.
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1977) (implying that good faith is
necessary for the competition privilege). If I hate the XYZ Widget Company and wish to
take their business, I, apparently, lose this privilege to interfere.
19961
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interference as part of its prima facie case. In addition, no interference
should be improper unless it involves illegal, tortious, or unethical conduct.
A. Burden of Proof
As noted in Part II of this Comment, Arkansas is one of a minority of
states that make intentional interference prima facie actionable.135 Arkansas
should join the majority of jurisdictions that require a plaintiff to plead and
prove improper or unjustified actions in order to establish a prima facie
case.' 36 Freedom of movement within the market is essential to a thriving
capitalist economy. However, this freedom must be, and is, limited by legal
rules regulating misuse of economic power. Other business torts regulating
abuse of power include civil conspiracy, misappropriation of trade secrets,
trade disparagement, and antitrust violations.'37 The interference torts, which
were created when very little regulation of business existed, should be
refined in light of our modem competitive market. The prima facie case
should require proof of some abuse of power within the marketplace.
If interference with contracts or business relationships was ever
considered wrongful per se, that perception is no longer the case. Logically,
within a competitive marketplace, businesspeople and business entities must
seek to maximize the gains they receive from all transactions and relation-
ships. Therefore, to treat the very act of intentional interference as wrongful
runs counter to the foundation of capitalism. As the Supreme Court of Utah
stated in Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom,'38 "[T]he prima facie-tort
135. Other jurisdictions include (1) Alabama, Pegram v. Hebding, 667 So. 2d 696 (Ala.
1995); Soap Co. v. Ecolab, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1366 (Ala. 1994); (2) the District of Columbia,
Cooke v. Griffiths-Garcia Corp., 612 A.2d 1251 (D.C. 1992); Brown v. Carr, 503 A.2d 1241
(D.C. 1986); (3) Minnesota, Furlev Sales & Assocs. v. North Am. Automotive Warehouse,
Inc., 325 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982); (4) New Hampshire, Baker v. Dennis Brown Realty, Inc.,
433 A.2d 1271 (N.H. 1981); (5) Rhode Island, Jolicoeur Furniture Co. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d
740 (R.I. 1995); Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1986); (6) Tennessee,
Collins v. Greene County Bank, 916 S.W.2d 941 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); (7) Texas, Texas
Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1996); (8) Virginia, Fox v. Deese, 362
S.E.2d 699 (Va. 1987); (9) West Virginia, C.W. Dev., Inc. v. Structures, Inc., 408 S.E.2d 41
(W. Va. 1991).
136. Short v. Haywood Printing Co., 667 N.E.2d 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Triffin v.
Janssen, 626 A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Nelson v. Web Water Dev. Ass'n, Inc., 507
N.W.2d 691 (S.D. 1993); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 829 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1992).
137. See Howard W. Walker, Interference with a Prospective Business Relationship: An
Old Tort for the New Marketplace, 35 BAYLOR L. REv. 123, 128-136 (1983) (discussing the
interrelationship between these business torts and the claim of tortious interference). Walker
recommends that plaintiffs combine existing business torts with tortious interference actions
because "damages [for tortious interference] have no limit and often the punitive recovery
will be greater than the compensation for the actual harm." Id. at 139.
138. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).
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approach ...makes actionable all sorts of contemporary examples of
otherwise legitimate persuasion .... [It] requires too little of the plaintiff."'39
The "prima facie tort" approach may cause the unfair result of requiring
a plaintiff to justify any act of successful competition within the market-
place.140 Furthermore, the defendants may have trouble proving a justifica-
tion for their interference given the uncertainty which surrounds the tort and
its defenses.' 4 '
Even assuming that many defendants will be able to prove their
justification, the Arkansas rule is still fundamentally unfair because "to
impose a potential for liability is to impose the cost of defending legal
actions."' 142 Litigation costs, legal fees which arises even if the tortious
interference claims are settled, and the potential costs of punitive damages
in the event of a plaintiffs verdict result in additional barriers to efficient
allocation of resources. The additional costs deter efficient breaches and
discourage the termination of inefficient business relationships. 143 The prima
facie imposition of liability for non-wrongful interference is also illogical in
relation to the notion that all individuals are autonomous. For example, if
an individual has the capacity to make a contract, and the individual then
decides to breach that contract, one might question whether the person who
advised the breach is liable for the decision. 1" Surely the entity that
decided to breach is responsible for this decision. Shifting the blame to the
139. Id. at 303. The court listed several "examples'of otherwise legitimate persuasion":
"efforts to persuade others not to eat certain foods, use certain substances, engage in certain
activities, or deal with certain entities." Id. Indeed, under the Arkansas formulation of the
tort, the following would be prima facie actionable: A father with two small children is
angry about a certain violent television program broadcast at 7:00 p.m. He organizes a group
of like-minded parents, and they form a protest group. Knowing that the advertisers have
contracts with the network, the group nevertheless sends letters to all of the advertisers who
show commercials during the television program, stating that if the advertisers continue to
support the television program, the parents will boycott their products. If the advertisers
decide to breach their contracts with the network, the group of parents is prima facie liable.
Of course, imposing liability in this instance may bring up First Amendment issues.
See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text. Under Arkansas's current formulation of the
tort, however, these parents could find themselves paying large legal fees to defend a tortious
interference suit.
140. See Dobbs, supra note 17, at 356-57. "Perhaps we should consider it unfair or
unjust to impose even possible liability upon a defendant when the chance that he is legally
responsible is minuscule, since to impose a potential for liability is to impose the cost of
defending legal actions."
141. See Myers, supra note 17, at 1110.
142. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 357.
143. See supra notes 107-30 and accompanying text.
144. See Dobbs, supra note 17, at 358-59.
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inducer implies that the entity lacked the capacity to decide to breach even
though it had the capacity to contract in the first place.' 45
However, if the interferer used illegal, tortious, or unethical conduct in
order to induce the breach, holding the interferer liable does not question the
breaching party's autonomy at all. The entity has the capacity to determine
whether to breach a contract if the market and all market participants
function in a proper way. If the proper functioning of the market is
undermined by the interferer's wrongful conduct, then the entity cannot be
expected to make a logical, informed decision. Requiring the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant's interference was improper gives some assurance
that only those actions which injure the plaintiff, individually, and the
market, as a whole, will result in a lawsuit.
B. Refining the Definition of "Improper Interference"
In addition to shifting the burden of proof, Arkansas should offer
litigants a concrete definition of "improper interference." Litigation in the
face of such a fluid definition as that offered by the Restatement (Second)
of Torts' gives juries too little guidance in the improper determination
thereby allowing personal prejudice into the deliberation process.'47 In
defining improper interference, many states follow the balancing approach
of the Restatement.' Some states allow the plaintiff to establish liability
through proof that the defendant acted with an improper purpose to harm the
defendant or by wrongful means.'49 Others seem to require an improper
motive to cause the breach or termination in order to establish tortious
145. See Dobbs, supra note 17, at 358-59.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1977).
147. Commenting on the lack of guidance offered by the Restatement formulation, Dobbs
noted, "[t]he problem with the interference tort lies in the complete absence of any principle
that will explain to us what judgments to make and why it is that liability sometimes is and
sometimes is not imposed." Dobbs, supra note 17, at 346 & n. 52.
148. See, e.g., Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc. v. Wigglesworth Imports, Inc., 546
N.E.2d 33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Eastern Kentucky Resources v. Arnett, 892 S.W.2d 617 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1995); Farrington v. Buttrey Food & Drug Stores, Co., 900 P.2d 277 (Mont. 1995);
Hoschler v. Kozlik, 529 N.W.2d 822 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995); Roberts v. General Motors Corp.,
643 A.2d 956 (N.H. 1994); Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assocs., Inc., 662 N.E.2d 1088 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1995); Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. D'Ambro, 596 A.2d 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991);
C.W. Development, Inc. v. Structures, Inc., 408 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1991).
149. See, e.g., Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High Sch. Dist. No. 82 Bd. of Governors,
909 P.2d 486 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Robert S. Weiss & Assocs., Inc. v. Wiederlight, 546
A.2d 216 (Conn. 1988).
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interference liability."' ° Still other states offer their own formulations of
"improper," which are as opaque as the Restatement factors.'51
The better approach is taken by a few states that offer more concrete
definitions of improper."15 Among those states, Oregon and South Carolina
stand out as providing the most concrete and complete definitions of
improper.'53 South Carolina requires proof of improper methods or purpose
for the tortious interference with a business expectancy claim'54 and proof
of absence of justification for an interference with a contract claim;'55 it is
150. See Frontier Cos., Inc. v. Jack White Co., 818 P.2d 645 (Alaska 1991) (holding that
the defendant must induce breach through wrongful conduct and must have intended breach
to result); Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 597, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that the defendant's actions must have been "malicious[ly] and exclusively directed
to the injury and damage of another" to establish liability).
151. See, e.g., Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 563 A.2d 31, 40 (N.J.
1989) (defining unjustified as conduct that is "not right and would not be sanctioned by the
'rules of the game'); Privette v. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 385 S.E.2d
185, 190 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (defining without justification, in the context of an
interference with employment claim, as "Motives... 'not reasonably related to the protection
of a legitimate business interest' of the defendant").
152. E.g., Connecticut requires "tortious conduct" for recovery and states that this
requirement may be established by proof of "fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation or
molestation... or [proof] that the defendant acted maliciously." Robert S. Weiss & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Wiederlight, 546 A.2d 216, 222-23 (Conn. 1988).
Arizona requires an improper motive or means. Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High
Sch. Dist. No. 82 Bd. of Governors, 909 P.2d 486 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). The plaintiff must
prove that the defendant acted "illegally or inequitably, as for example, . . . [using] fraud,
duress, or abusing economic power." Bar J Bar Cattle Co. v. Pace, 763 P.2d 545, 548 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1988).
Michigan defines improper as "illegal, unethical, or fraudulent" conduct. Michigan
Podiatric Medical Ass'n v. Nat'l Foot Care Program, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 349, 355 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989). New York, which requires wrongful means to prove interference with a business
expectancy, defines wrongful means as "'physical violence, fraud or misrepresentation, civil
suits and criminal prosecutions, and some degree of economic pressure."' N.B.T. Bancorp,
Inc. v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, Inc., 641 N.Y.S.2d 581, 586 (N.Y. 1996).
153. South Carolina defines "[m]ethods of interference considered improper [as] those
means that are illegal or independently tortious, such as violations of statutes, regulations,
or recognized common-law rules ... [or methods that] violate an established standard of a
trade or profession, or involve unethical conduct." Love v. Gamble, 448 S.E.2d 876, 883
(S.C. Ct. App. 1994). The Oregon formulation provides that the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant acted with motive or means that were wrongful "by reason of a statute or other
regulation, or a recognized rule of common law, or ... an established standard of a trade or
profession." Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Or. 1978);
Willamette Dental Group, P.C. v. Oregon Dental Serv. Corp., 882 P.2d 637, 644 (Or. Ct.
App. 1994). The Top Service court provided further examples of improper means including
"violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded
litigation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood." Top Service, 582 P.2d at 1371 n. 11.
154. Crandall Corp. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 395 S.E.2d 179, 180 (S.C. 1990).
If there are two purposes, then the improper purpose must be the predominant purpose. Id.
155. Southern Contracting, Inc. v. H.C. Brown Constr. Co., 450 S.E.2d 602, 604 (S.C.
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not clear from the case law whether the two elements are equivalent.
Oregon requires proof of a wrongful means or an improper objective for
both a business expectancy'56 and contract'57 claim. To avoid confusion, the
Oregon requirement of improper motive or means for both torts is prefera-
ble. 5 ' By adopting a rule requiring proof that the defendant violated a
statute, regulation, common law rule, or established professional or ethical
standard, Arkansas courts can establish concrete standards for business
entities. To plan and function within a competitive market, these entities
must know, with some specificity, the conduct that will result in liability.
In addition, providing a more objective standard will help juries avoid
unintentionally injecting personal bias into deliberation. Finally, the Oregon
and South Carolina definitions of improper contain sufficient flexibility to
adequately protect the stability of contractual and business relations. By
proving the existence and violation of an established professional or ethical
standard, plaintiffs can sue for tortious interference even in the absence of
other remedies against the interferer. No independent statutory or common
law violation is necessary to establish liability.
Although the Oregon and South Carolina formulations allow liability
based on improper means or motive, Arkansas should not adopt the
wrongful motive prong of the "improper" determination.' All competing
businesses or employees are likely to harbor some negative feelings toward
their rivals. 60 As a matter of practicality, because at least some animosity
may be involved in virtually any interference, the courts will be put in a
position of judging which motive was the dominant one in the decision to
interfere or basing liability on the very existence of the improper motive, no
matter how slight.'16 If an entity takes an action, otherwise proper, solely
for the purpose of interfering with the contract of its rival, there is no
satisfactory reason for holding that entity civilly liable. A lawful act should
Ct. App. 1994). The plaintiff bears the burden of proof. Id.
156. Willamette Dental Group, 882 P.2d at 644.
157. Huffman & Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, 857 P.2d 101, 110 (Or. 1993).
158. Although the concept of damages is beyond the scope of this comment, this author
also advocates the Oregon rule requiring the plaintiff to prove damages "beyond the fact of
interference itself." Willamette Dental Group, 882 P.2d at 644. This effectively requires the
plaintiff to mitigate her damages by pursuing a breach of contract action against the
breaching party and to prove, with specificity, the damages resulting from any interference.
159. Many commentators advocate doing away with liability based solely upon
interference for a wrongful purpose. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 17, at 347-50; Myers,
supra note 17, at 1126-35.
160. Myers, supra note 17, at 1131.
161. For commentary on the mixed motive issue, see Stephen P. Clark, Main Line v.
Basinger and the Mixed Motive Manager: Reexamining the Agent's Privilege to Induce
Breach of Contract, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 609 (1995).
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not become unlawful solely because of its motive.62 Furthermore, a
plaintiff attempting to prove wrongful motive likely will resort to circum-
stantial proof of wrongful conduct to do so, making proof of improper intent
redundant. Resting liability on an improper purpose alone also establishes
liability based on more subjective criteria than even the Restatement factors
provide.'63
Establishing some degree of wrongful conduct in a tortious interference
claim might also avoid an as yet insufficiently explored issue of the First
Amendment's application to the tort. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit recently held that the First Amendment was a valid defense to claims
of tortious interference in the context of a labor disputes."6 However, in the
past twenty years, the United States Supreme Court has extended protection
to commercial speech in several contexts.'65 Tortious interference liability
has the potential to chill commercial speech. Although the Restatement
(Second) of Torts takes the position that a tortious interference claim may
not be based upon the "dissemination of truthful information,"'66 several
courts have based liability on persuasion to breach alone, without requiring
162. See Myers, supra note 17, at 1131-32 & n. 178 (quoting Justice Cooley's famous
admonition that "malicious motives make a bad case worse, but they cannot make that wrong
which is in its essence lawful").
163. According to Dobbs, this may result in verdicts based on an assessment of character
or personality. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 348.
164. Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local,
39 F.3d 191, 196 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that "the malice standard required for actionable
defamation claims during labor disputes must equally be met for a tortious interference claim
based on the same conduct or statements" so that the "plaintiff may not avoid the protection
afforded by the Constitution and federal labor law merely by the use of creative pleading.").
165. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469
(1989) (finding that there must be a "reasonable fit" between the restriction on commercial
speech and the government objective that restriction furthers); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (establishing a four-part
test for commercial speech cases); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772(a) (1977). Note, however, that the
comments to § 772 list three requirements for the honest advice privilege: (1) the advice
must be furnished in response to a request; (2) the speaker must give advice within the scope
of the request; and (3) the advice must be honest. Id. § 772 cmt. c. Honesty, under section
772, means good faith. Id. § 772 cmt. e.
Arkansas recognizes a conditional privilege to make defamatory statements regarding
another if the "circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief' that the statements affect
the third party's interest and the person making the statements has a duty to communicate
these concerns to the third party. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Felton, 276 Ark. 304, 307, 634
S.W.2d 135, 136-37 (1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 (1981)). The
courts have not applied this privilege in a tortious interference context.
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a false statement."' Given the extensive Constitutional protections of free
speech, the United States Supreme Court eventually may require that the
state justify its restriction of the free flow of commercial information in the
tortious interference context. Requiring proof of wrongful conduct that
manipulates the market might help make tortious interference law consistent
with free speech protections.'68
VI. CONCLUSION
The Arkansas formulation of the interference torts must be updated in
light of America's modem, competitive economy. To insure freedom of
movement within the economy and encourage the efficient allocation of
resources, Arkansas should require the plaintiff to bear the burden of
proving improper interference by the defendant. Furthermore, in order to
offer concrete guidelines for those trying to avoid liability and to aid juries
in making fair decisions while maintaining necessary flexibility in the tort's
definition, Arkansas should adopt the Oregon and South Carolina definitions
of "improper means." These definitions would require a violation of a
statute, regulation, common law rule, standard of the trade or profession, or
ethical rule in order to establish liability. However, no liability should result
solely from lawful interference for an improper purpose.
Elisa Masterson White
167. Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients By Departing Partners &
Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, & Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 97 n. 414
(1988) (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS at 988).
168. See id. at 96. Johnson quotes Prosser & Keaton on Torts for the proposition that
"[t]here is a question whether the First Amendment ... might restrict liability to those
[tortious interference] cases in which some degree of personal fault ... [is] shown." Id.
(quoting PROSSER & KEATON ON TORTS at 988).
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